Deontology (Rachels, Chapter 9 & 10)
- In every reading thus far, I have had a near instant objection to every philosophical idea that was posed—whether I agreed with it or not; however, I find it very difficult to find immediate and solid objection to Kant's idea of moral objectivism. The only issue that I have with Kant's proposal is that he assign expectation of a person in his example. In Kant's charity example, the person who doesn't give to charity has the expectation that someone should help him if he were in need, but what if that weren't the case? If my moral system outlines that I have no obligation to donate to charity, I should have the assumption that everyone else also has no obligation to give to charity. Kant's example criticizing a seemingly silly moral system. Most people, which should be all people, ought not put moral obligations on other that they would no put onto themselves. This idea is relatively unassertive, and if were taken into account, all of Kant's examples become falsified in that people should expect others not to do something they define as morally permissible.
- I find philosophers become very practicable when their moral systems are under attack and very hypothetical when contesting other systems. They do this because this is virtually the only way to contest a hypothetical that shows holes in a moral system (which probably all moral systems have), but it seems so intellectually dishonest. I find that most generally sound moral systems have very little practicable use, and philosophers are quick to agree with this assertion as long as it is to defend their impracticable moral system from a hypothetical. Philosophers seem to be quick to point out impracticality of a moral system so long as it is not their own.
- Every philosopher should operate under the assumption that we can never know the true outcome of an action. All moral actions are done using the best reasoning by the person acting; it is impossible to act with a certainty of the outcome. Nearly all moral systems have critics that point out this flaw, and it is become nauseating to read it over and over. It's such an obvious idea, and it is irritating that is not something that is held in the minds of all philosophers.
- While I am adamantly against the idea of objective moral rules, I find it hard to call objective moral rules "untenable" on the basis of it being impossible to choose between two objective immoral actions. This example is under the assumption that all morally impermissible actions are at the same degree of "undesirability." If a moral system were to outline murder and lying as morally impermissible actions, it is dishonest to say these are on the same level of undesirability. Surely if given the choice between lying and killing, lying, while still impermissible, would be the better of two evils. In other words, morally impermissible actions follow some-kind of proportionality.
- I believe that there are no objective moral rules; however, everyone should operate among moral rules of their defined moral system. From here, philosophical debate should be centered around what moral system leads to the best outcomes—an extremely subjective debate.
- I agree with so much of Kant's thoughts, but we have utterly opposite ways of arriving at the same ideas.
- I hate Utilitarianism with all my being.
- On the note of Retributivism: As a believer that no morals are objective, I cannot actively rally for the punishment of others given the violation of a moral system; however, I instinctively want to. I am not sure if a series or reciprocated values could be used to justify Retributivism in my moral system, but I see no immediate issue with it. By "reciprocated values" (which I think could be tied into Social Contracts, but I don't know enough about the term to use it here) I mean that a person can expect an action to be done to them if they find themselves doing it to another. This idea leaves no subjective proportionality or no subjective idea of morals while also inherently including Retributivism. i.e. If a person find killing another person to be morally permissible, and they kill another person, they can expect that they will also be killed.
- Kant expressed a very similar idea in the follow sections, further proving that I agree with Kant on a lot, but with a different premises.
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