Virtue Ethics & Feminist Ethics of Care (Rachels, Chapter 11 & 12)

• When I read about Ethical Egoism, I didn't dismiss it as fast as others would. Ethical Egoism is a necessarily horrible thing, and I would argue people already act in a manner that can be described as Ethical Egoism which doesn't devolve society to utter chaos as many philosophers seem to think it would. That said, there are extremes to Ethical Egoism that can't be accounted for (when applied to myself). Hobbes' idea of the Social Contract seems to plug many holes in Ethical Egoism while operating under the same assumption that , I believe to be true, all people are ultimately self-interested. The idea works in theory and operates in a system of practicality. 
• When I was defending Ethical Egoism, I stated that a lot of the time the "obvious" self-interested act is not self-interested. In a lot of cases, it is, in the long run, better to do something that would inconvenience you because it will pay off later. So by nature of that, the "self-interested" act is not self-interested. If that thinking was held by everyone, Ethical Egoism would not devolve society to savagery. The criticism lodged at Ethical Egoism operate under the assumption that we cannot have long term understandings of the rectification of our actions. I don't believe that to be the case, but that criticism is still somewhat valid because the theory of Ethical Egoism itself isn't exclusive to my line of thinking when trying to apply Ethical Egoism to reality. This idea seem to be solved in Hobbes' theory and put into practicality using the Social Contract. Hobbes' outlined a system of Ethical Egoism in which people are bound to the thinking that I held with Ethical Egoism. 
• The first objection outlined by Rachels is silly. The social contract is only in place for people who subscribe to it. If people don't want to subscribe to it, then they are not bound to do such actions and other are also no bound. If I sign a social contract with a certain people, I have no obligation to keep the contract with people who don't sign it. Example: If I and my friend Joe decided to sign a social contract that forbids lying, I don't have an obligation to not lie to people who don't take part in this contract. I am only to reciprocate what is outlined by the Social Contract to people who are part of the Social Contract—not hold the values of the Social Contract itself. The Social Contract is not a contract defining what is moral or immoral, it is a contract defining what people in the contract will do in corroboration to better the lives of everyone who subscribes to the contract. 
• "Nevertheless, isn't it morally wrong to torture an animal, when there is no good reason for it?"
• This absolutely doesn't matter at all in regard to the Social Contract. The Social Contract, again, is not outlining what is or isn't moral, it is outlining the corroboration of a social society for the benefit of people who agree to the contract. If a being is not able to abide by the Social Contract, why should it be considered to be treated as such? Immoral beings shouldn't have moral considerations. 
• This point doesn't undermine the moral duties of Social Contract Theory because the party that was brought up is completely unable to uphold the theory. And in the event that a moral creature is not going to abide by the contract, why should it expect reciprocated values of moral duties? 
• Nonhuman animals can surely suffer, and I don't subscribe to Descartes' or Malebranche's thinking; however, the animal also doesn't care for the suffering of other beings. If the animal doesn't care about my well-being, why should I care for its well-being?
• The Social Contract Theory is only concerned with that of which is relevant to creating a social society. The killing or torturing of an animal does not concern the Social Contract; the Social Contract doesn't entail the good or poor treatment of animals. 
• A person who cares for nonhuman animals can operate under the Social Contract due to the limitations of what the Social Contract forbids. 
• There are two main ways of thinking that I can expand in regard to beings that cannot uphold or understand a Social Contract: 
• 1) Beings who cannot understand and uphold the Social Contract have no moral considerations because the beings have no ability for consideration themselves. 
• 2) Beings who cannot willfully accept the Social Contract can also not willfully decline the Social Contract; therefore, we cannot treat them as if they are not part of the contract because they are unable to accept or decline such a contract.
• The second line of thinking is more digestible for most people because humans, generally, want to care for the mentally disabled, and some humans want to care for nonhuman animals.
• Considering there is currently no research to show that men and women think rationally different in even decently measurable ways, the conversation about the different in ethics regarding men and women do not interest me as it seems contrived by historical sexism. 
• When a philosophical idea was formed means much more to the consideration of the idea rather than the background and characteristics of who proposed the idea. Outside characteristics are held with too much regard.
• Even if there are moderately different avenues of thinking between men and women, there is still no way of knowing how much of this is caused by nature or societal expectations (i.e. nurture). Therefore, the discussion seems pointless.